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Abstract
The proliferation of Wireless Highway Addressable
Remote Transducer (WirelessHART) communications
in support of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)
applications is accompanied by increased
vulnerability concerns that amplify the need for
improved pre-attack security and post-attack forensic
methods. This paper summarizes demonstration
activity aimed at applying Time Domain Distinct
Native Attribute (TD-DNA) fingerprinting and
improving
feature
selection
to
increase
computational efficiency and the potential for
near-real time operational application. Assessments
include both pre-classification and post-classification
dimensional reduction using TD-DNA fingerprint
features extracted from experimentally collected
WirelessHART signals.
Results show that
pre-classification selection methods are superior,
with average percent correct classification
differential of 8% < %CD < 1% being maintained
using selected feature subsets containing only 24
(10%) of the 243 full-dimensional features.

1. Introduction
The overwhelming focus in Internet of Things
(IoT) growth has been in the so-called “Consumer
IoT” [1] subset being used to connect an increasing
number of household, personal, and consumer-level
devices. While similar growth across the Industrial
IoT (IIoT) subspace has been somewhat slower, some
improved functionality and efficiency has been
realized across nearly all industries [1]. This includes
deployment of WirelessHART signaling which is “by
far the largest digital communications technology
deployed in the process industries with over 40 million
field instruments supporting HART technology
installed worldwide [2]. This includes support to over
24,000 WirelessHART networks that logged over 5
billion operating hours [3]. While estimates for the
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number of currently fielded WirelessHART networks
and devices vary, there are predictions of exponential
growth through 2028 within the oil, gas, chemical, and
power generation industries [4].
Whether addressing pre-attack defense or
post-attack forensic analysis, the preponderance of
threat detection and protection work in process
control systems occurs above the PHY layer [5],
including bit-level solutions implemented in the
upper communication protocol layers [2, 6, 7].
Relative to IIoT vulnerability, the U.S. Industry
Control System (ICS) Cyber Emergency Response
Team (ICS-CERT) indicated that, “The gateway [of
an ICS system] … is where you need to pay the most
attention” [8]. This certainly includes all PHY layer
communications between a process sensor and the
gateway. Therefore, to realize the cross-layer security
benefits envisioned in [5], the desirable architecture
would include the ability to operate across all IIoT
elements by balancing available resources to exploit
information at the most vulnerable nodes and achieve
an acceptable level of threat warning.
One PHY-based method supporting offensive,
defensive, and exploitive network operations is Time
Domain Distinct Native Attribute (TD-DNA)
Fingerprinting which has been successfully used to
discriminate IoT and IIoT communication devices
and their operating states [9-18]. The TD-DNA
fingerprinting methodology therein is well-suited for
consideration here given 1) the observed ZigBee-like
signal characteristics of WirelessHART signals, and
2) the ability to perform Dimensional Reduction
Analysis (DRA) and identify the minimal subset of
features required to achieve a given level of
discrimination performance.
The work here extends first-look results presented
in [18] that included ZigBee device discrimination
and DRA with feature selection using 1) an adopted
post-classification Random Forest (RndF) relevance
ranking method, and 2) a newly developed
pre-classification Wilcoxon Rank Sum (WRS)
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2.1. IIoT Threat Framework
A majority of IIoT risk mitigation effort has been
dedicated to threats posed by actors having malicious
intent, especially when those IIoT devices support
critical infrastructure (CI) elements. However, when
considering CI and IIoT in general, there are threats
that do not originate from malicious actors that can
have similarly catastrophic effects. As reflected in
Fig. 1, the threat categorization in [19] sufficiently
embodies IIoT threats under three main categories:
accidental, malicious, and natural.
Attack effects within the IIoT threat framework are
captured in ICS Impact subcategories that have been
added here and shown in Fig. 1. These include both
1) Incidental impact (e.g., Slammer Worm at the
Davis-Besse nuclear plant [20]), and 2) By-Design
impact where specific IIoT element vulnerabilities
are targeted (e.g., Tehama Colusa Canal sabotage
[20], Stuxnet [21], Shamoon [22], and CrashOverride
[23]). Both impact categories include insider attacks
of given elements that can be directly accessed, with
responsible Agent(s) including human, technological,
and natural actors [19].
The By-Design impact in Fig. 1 includes creation
of malware like TRITON/TRISIS which aims to
degrade safety interrupt systems whereby “persons,
property, and/or the environment could suffer
physical harm” [24]. While malicious threats such as
these have potentially catastrophic effects, the threat
framework in Fig. 1 also illuminates the fact that the
impact of accidental or natural category threats could
have equally serious consequences.

2.2. WirelessHART Signaling
WirelessHART is a variant of the wired HART
protocol used to exchange information via 4-20 mA
current loop signaling that exists in nearly all legacy
systems. WirelessHART adapters support exchange of
the legacy 4-20 mA current information using wireless
communications in the 2.4 GHz band. The signaling is
compliant with IEEE 802.15.4 PHY layer standards
and possess ZigBee-like characteristics that have been
successfully exploited in previous work [17,18].
WirelessHART devices from two suppliers were
considered here for demonstration, including the
Siemens AW210 [25] and Pepperl and Fuchs Bullet
[26] devices. The 802.15.4 PHY layer operation for
these devices is shown in Fig. 2. As common in many
wireless protocols, the transmitted bursts include a
preamble response which was observed to be the first
160 µSec (defined as the PreAmbRgn in Fig. 2). The
PreAmbRgn is the primary Region of Interest (ROI)
exploited here for TD-DNA Fingerprinting.
PHY Protocol Data Units (PPDU)

IEEE 802.15.4
Nomenclature

2. Background

Figure 1. IIoT threat framework with categorization
of IIoT elements and agents from [19] and Incidental
and By-Design ICS-impact elements added here.

Exprimental
Nomenclature

method based on nonparametric statistical testing.
Specific extension includes 1) transition to
WirelessHart and ZigBee-Like signal processing, and
2) use of additional DRA methodologies with feature
selection
based
on
both the
adopted
post-classification Generalized Relevance Learning
Vector Quantized Improved (GRLVQI) method, and
the adopted pre-classification ReliefF method.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides background information on the IIoT Threat
Framework,
WirelessHART,
TD-DNA
Fingerprinting, MDA/ML Discrimination, and DRA.
Section 3 details the demonstration methodology
used to generate Section 4 DRA Performance
Results.
The paper concludes with Section 5
summary and conclusions.

1 Octet

1 Octet

1 Octet

1 Octet

1 Octet

1 Octet

VARIABLE

Start
Frame
(SFD)
Synchronization Header (SHR)

PHY
Header
(PHR)

PHY Service Data Unit (PSDU) - PHY Payload

Preamble

Preamble Region
(PreAmbRgn)

Signal ID Region
(SigIDRgn)

Set Point Region
(SetPtRgn)

Figure 2. WirelessHART IEEE 802.15.4 details
[27] with 1) IEEE nomenclature and prescribed
signal durations, and 2) experimental nomenclature
and observed signal durations under this work.
As done previously for ZigBee devices in [14, 17,
18], WirelessHART TD-DNA features were
extracted from experimentally collected data for
ND = 8 like-model devices.
The signals were
collected with a National Instruments N2952
Software Defined Radio (SDR) having an RF
bandwidth of WRF = 10 MHz and operating at a
sample frequency of fS = 10 MSps in both the
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In-phase and Quadrature-phase (I/Q) channels. Postcollection MATLAB processing was performed on a
burst-by-burst basis and included baseband
down-conversion, followed by filtering with a
4th-order Butterworth filter having a bandwidth of
WBB = 1 MHz. The collections were made in a
typical office environment (channel conditions
consistent with WirelessHART applications) which
yielded an average collected Signal-to-Noise Ratio of
SNRC = 39.0 dB.
The collected signals were
SNR-scaled by adding independent, like-filtered,
power-scaled Additive White Gaussian Noise to
reflect operating conditions for SNR Î [5.0, 39.0].

2.3. TD-DNA Fingerprinting
TD-DNA Fingerprinting utilizes various machine
learning algorithms and concepts such as feature
selection via DRA which has been the subject of prior
related works [9, 18, 28]. The demonstration here
focuses on examining DRA methods for use with an
MDA/ML classifier, given the MDA/ML classification
process has been shown to be computationally efficient
while reliably discriminating IIoT signals [9, 13].
Results here are based on TD-DNA fingerprints
generated from WirelessHART burst preamble
responses and are generated using a methodology
consistent with prior related works [9-18]. The
instantaneous amplitude (AMP), phase (PHZ), and
frequency (FRQ) responses of the PreAmbRgn ROI
are divided into NR = 26 subregions. All ROI samples
are used for generating features as well, for a total of
NR = 26+1 = 27 fingerprinting regions. A total of
NStat = 3 statistics of variance (s2), skewness (g), and
kurtosis (k) are computed within each region to form,
𝑭𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕 = [𝝈𝟐 ⋮ 𝜸 ⋮ 𝜿]𝟏×𝟑 ,

(1)

where ⋮ denotes concatenation. Accounting for the
NR+1 = 27 regions and each instantaneous response,
the Regional Statistic Vector is given by,
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕
𝑭𝑹𝒈𝒏 = 4𝑭𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕
𝑹𝟏 ⋮ 𝑭𝑹𝟐 ⋮ ⋯ ⋮ 𝑭𝑵𝐑 8𝟏 9𝟏×[𝟑(𝑵

𝐑 8𝟏)]

.

(2)

The regional vectors are used to form the Composite
TD Fingerprint Vector given by,
𝑹𝒈𝒏

𝑹𝒈𝒏

𝑹𝒈𝒏

𝑭𝑻𝑫 = 4𝑭𝑨𝑴𝑷 ⋮ 𝑭𝑷𝑯𝒁 ⋮ 𝑭𝑭𝑹𝑸 9

𝟏×𝑵𝐅

,

(3)

where NF is the total number of features. For three
instantaneous response with NR+1 = 27 and NStat = 3
statistics, the full-dimensional set of fingerprint
features considered here includes NFD = 243 features.

2.4. MDA/ML Processing

The MDA/ML processing used here is a readily
implementable, computationally efficient process that
has provided reliable device discrimination in prior
TD-DNA works [9, 11-18]. As detailed in [18], MDA

is effectively a feature selection process that performs
best when input class features and their corresponding
projections are Gaussian distributed. The process
includes generation of projection matrix W with a
goal of maximizing between-class separation
(projected class means) while minimizing within-class
spread (projected class variance). For discriminating
NCls classes using input fingerprints (F) having NF
features, W has dimension NF x (NCls-1) and
effectively projects (1xNF)-dimensional F into the
(NCls-1)-dimensional decision space.
Given a trained MDA “model” (projection matrix
W, input fingerprint scale factors, projected class
training means, and projected class training
variances) a 1 vs. NCls called-class estimate (correct
or incorrect) for an input “unknown” testing
fingerprint FTst is defined as 𝑭𝑾
GHI = 𝑭 GHI 𝐖, where
𝑭𝑾
is
the
projection
of
F
in
the
Fisher space. The
Tst
GHI
classification estimate is based on the conditional
probability relationship in the Fisher projection
space. Assuming equal probability of class
occurrence and equal error costs, the probability
relationship becomes a Maximum Likelihood (ML)
estimate. The class yielding the highest probability
becomes the called-class for 𝑭𝑾
GHI .
Overall cross-class percent correct classification
(%C) is calculated as the percent of correct
called-class estimates from the total number of
classification decisions. Given that the classification
decisions represent independent Monte Carlo trials,
95% Confidence Interval (CI95%) analysis consistent
with [9] is used for comparative (best, same,
different, etc.) assessments. For visual clarity, the
CI95% intervals are intentionally omitted from figures,
and the vertical extent of data markers appropriately
sized such that they encompass the CI95% intervals.
Thus, overlapping data markers represent statistically
identical and/or indeterminate performance and
non-overlapping data markers represent statistically
different performance.

2.5. DRA Feature Selection
With the surge of available data for machine
learning applications, there has been renewed interest
in DRA as a means to reduce the scale of the input
data to a manageable size [29]. As depicted in Fig. 3,
the feature selection aspect of DRA may be
categorized as using label information (supervised,
semi-supervised, and unsupervised) and selection
strategies (filter, wrapper, and embedded) [29, 30, 31].
The methods here use supervised approaches, i.e.,
labeled data, whereas semi-supervised and
unsupervised approaches use partially-labeled or
unlabeled data, respectively [29]. The DRA methods
here include two selection strategies that include filter
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Figure 3. Feature selection categories from [29] and
[30]. Shading indicates areas covered here.
(pre-classification) and wrapper (post-classification).
Filter strategies most often employ pre-classification
ranking and statistical techniques [31], have low
computational cost, and are well-suited for higher
dimensional data [30].
Wrapper methods differ in that they “use the
intended learning algorithm itself to evaluate the
features” [29] and are optimized for that learning
algorithm [30]. While this “optimization” could be a
strength, wrapper methods are limited since they are
only intended to work with that same learning
algorithm, and therefore may suffer from
overfitting [31]. The selection strategies considered
here include two pre-classification filtering and two
post-classification wrapper approaches. All methods
produce an output vector of NF sorted features with
associated weights. A brief summary of each DRA
method is provided in the following sections.
2.5.1. Post-Classification RndF
The Random Forest (RndF) classifier includes an
ensemble of single decision tree classifiers that
collectively produce a single classification decision
and provide a feature relevance metric [32]. Among
the hyperparameter tuning for RndF, there are two
fundamental parameters that affect classifier
performance, including 1) the number of decision trees
(classifiers), and 2) the number of predictors (features)
sampled at each node. The classifier considers all
available features at the initial node, then makes
subsequent splits based on a random predictor
selection and threshold values at each child node. All
features are not considered at each of the child nodes
and the selection is done with replacement, thus a
feature may be used as a splitting criterion at multiple
nodes. The features selected as the splitting criterion
include those producing the largest change in
Gini-Index (GI) [9]. The RndF process supports
post-classification DRA by providing a mean decrease
in the GI metric [9, 10] that is computed for the kth
feature by averaging the change in GI each time the kth
feature is used at a splitting decision.

2.5.2. Post-Classification GRLVQI
General Relevance Learning Vector Quantization
Improved (GRLVQI) is an extension of Kohonen’s
Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ) [33] which is in
the family of self-organizing Neural Network (NN)
approaches using nearest Prototype Vector (PV)
optimization. As a classifier, LVQ associates a PV
with a given class (typically multiple PVs per class).
When an observation is input to the network, the PV
closest to the observation “fires” and the prediction
accuracy is based on whether or not the firing PV(s)
are associated with the correct class for the
observation. GRLVQI extends LVQ by incorporating
cost functions, learning methods, and logic and
operation improvements [33].
There are five
fundamental
hyperparameters
for
GRLVQI
processing, including the gradient descent learning
rate, relevance learning rate, conscience rate(s), and
the number of class PVs. The correct model
construction requires expertise or appropriate
heuristics [33].
2.5.3. Pre-Classification WRS
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum (WRS) method is a
nonparametric statistical approach and is therefore
unconstrained in terms of the assumptions required for
parametric statistical methods, e.g., normality of the
underlying distribution. The WRS requires only that
the samples are independent and from a continuous
distribution [34]. The output of the WRS test is a
determination as to whether or not two observations
are from distributions with equal medians, regardless
of the exact nature of the two underlying distributions.
As a DRA method, the WRS test was developed in
[18] and is utilized to comapre a feature across all
classes for a given classification problem. A feature is
considered more relevant the more instances the WRS
test concludes that the cross-class comparison has a
different median. The feature relevance is computed
as a two factor product: 1) the raw count of WRS test
failures and 2) the entropy of the repsective p-values
(an aggregate measure of confidence of each separate
WRS test). The only parameter to modify is the
a-value for the statistical test.
2.5.4. Pre-Classification ReliefF
ReliefF processing is derived from the Relief
algorithm developed in [35, 36]. Relief is an
instance-based learning algorithm that was originally
conceived to implement a statistical approach to
feature selection (as opposed to a purely heuristic
search) resulting in improved learning time and
accuracy compared to other feature selection methods
[36]. Relief picks a sample of m triplets from the total
NF features and computes a Euclidian distance-based
comparison metric. A feature weight vector is
routinely updated as the algorithm runs. Similar to the
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pre-classification WRS method, there is one parameter
to modify, k, which corresponds to the number of
nearest neighbors considered during comparison.
ReliefF overcomes the noted limitations in [35, 36] by
modifying the Relief algorithm to allow for incomplete
data sets and NCls > 2 classes [37, 38].

3. Demonstration Methodology

Compairson of the four DRA feature selection
methods included the following steps:

3.1. Step 1: Analysis SNR Selection

For all DRA selection methods, proper subsets of
NDRA < NFD full-dimensional fingeprint feaures were
selected and classification performed. Given that
feature relevance is SNR dependent, the specific SNR
used for DRA assessments was selected by
considering the average percent correct (%C) using
the NFD feature set with the MDA/ML, RndF, and
GRLVQI classifiers. All subsequent classification
performance results, with the exception of those
presented in Fig. 4, are for MDA/ML classification.
The analysis SNR values are selected based on the
Fig. 4 results which show %C performance for all
three classification methods using the fulldimensional NFD features set.

3.2. Step 2: Qualitative DRA Application

Qualitative DRA is performed using NDRA = NFD /3
(66% reduction) feature subsets denoted as
AMP-Only, PHZ-Only, and FRQ-Only DRA sets.
Segmentation of the NFD features into response-centric
subsets is accomodated by the sequential construct of
FTD fingerprint elements in (3). Qualitative DRA
assessment was used for identifying the most useful
response features and for comparison with quantative
DRA selection in Section 3.3. Segmentation of a
representative TD-DNA fingerprint into AMP-Only,
PHZ-Only, and FRQ-Only subsets is shown in Fig. 5
for fingerprints of NFD = 234 features.

Figure 5. Representative TD-DNA fingerprint
from (3) showing the relative location of feature
regions using normalized feature values.

3.3. Step 3: Quantative DRA Application

Figure 4. Classification performance of MDA/ML,
RndF, and GRLVQI using the full-dimensional
NFD = 243 feature set.
The results in Fig. 4 did not use “optimized” RndF
nor the GRLVQI processes; the results were generated
using empirical hyperparameter settings from prior
wireless signal discrimination work similar to
WirelessHART. Collectively, all three classifiers
achieve the %C ≥ 90% benchmark for SNR ≥ 7 dB
and the MDA/ML classifier maintains %C ≥ 99% for
SNR ≥ 14 dB. Therefore, results of RndF and
GRLVQI processes were used for DRA feature
selection based on rank-ordering feature relevances at
SNR = 7 dB and SNR = 14 dB.

Quantitative DRA is based on feature relevance,
such as presented in Fig. 6 for the full-dimensional
NFD = 243 feature set at SNR = 7 dB. This figure
shows normalized relevance weighting versus unsorted
feature index number for post-classification RndF
(Fig. 6a) and GRLVQI (Fig. 6b) processes, and
pre-classification WRS (Fig. 6c) and ReliefF (Fig. 6d)
processes. The subplots also show the relationship of
quantitative feature relevance to the qualitative index
boundaries used for selecting the AMP-Only,
PHZ-Only, and FRQ-Only features considered in
Section 3.2.
For DRA feature selection, the unsorted relevance
metrics in Fig. 6 are rank-ordered (sorted highest to
lowest) for each of the DRA methods. These
higher-is-more-relevant metrics show that 1) the RndF
and GRLVQI plots decrease rapidly (lower number of
more relevant features) and become near-zero,
whereas 2) the WRS and ReliefF plots decrease less
rapidly (higher number of more relevant features)
with fewer (WRS) or no (ReliefF) near-zero relevant
features.

Page 6391

3.4. Step 4: MDA/ML Classification

(a) Post-Classification RndF Relevance

MDA/ML classification performance was
assessed using the qualitative NDRA = 81 AMP-Only,
PHZ-Only, and FRQ-Only DRA subsets from Step 2
and quantitative NDRA Î {0.10, 0.15, …, 0.50}xNFD
DRA subsets selected using the sorted feature
rankings from Step 3. That is, using the top-ranked
10%, 15%, …, 50% of the NFD = 243 of the
full-dimensional features. Performance is assessed
relative to the %C ≥ 90% benchmark for individual
DRA subsets as well as accumulated averages of %C
for pre-classification and post-classification
methods.

4. DRA Performance Results
4.1. Qualitative DRA Feature Selection

(b) Post-Classification GRLVQI Relevance

MDA/ML classification using qualitatively
selected DRA feature sets are shown in Fig. 7 and are
useful for identifying the response(s) (AMP, PHZ, or
FRQ) that contributes most to classification accuracy.
The plots show 1) full-dimensional NFD = 243 results
from Fig. 4, overlaid with 2) results using the
NDRA = 81 (66% of the NFD) qualitatively selected
AMP-Only, PHZ-Only, and FRQ-Only subsets.

(c) Pre-Classification WRS Relevance

Figure 7. MDA/ML classification performance for
NFD = 243 full-dimensional and qualitatively selected
NDRA = 81 feature subsets showing that PHZ-Only
features are dominant.

(d) Pre-Classification ReliefF Relevance

Figure 6. Normalized relevance versus unsorted
feature index number for full-dimensional NFD = 243
feature set at SNR = 7 dB.
The AMP-Only,
PHZ-Only, and FRQ-Only qualitative DRA feature
regions are shown for comparison.

The results from Fig. 7 suggest DRA feature
selection at SNR = 7 dB to be a point of interest since it
corresponds to the %C » 90% point from Fig. 4 and
that despite the overall trend, AMP-Only features
produce a higher %C than PHZ-Only. Similarly,
SNR = 14 dB is shown to be a point of interest because
the PHZ-Only features dominate in %C and produce
statistically similar results to the full-dimensional set.
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Table 1. Comparison of Fig. 7 %C performance at
SNR = 7 dB and SNR = 14 dB for full-dimensional and
qualitatively selected DRA feature sets.
Qualitative
DRA Subset
AMP
PHZ
FRQ
Full-Dim

%C @
SNR = 7 dB
63.00%
56.92%
27.55%
90.50%

%C @
SNR = 14 dB
64.66%
99.35%
49.51%
99.96%

Table 1 shows a comparison of Fig. 7 results at
SNR = 7 dB and SNR = 14 dB. At SNR = 7 dB, the best
case DRA performance is %C » 63.0% for AMP-Only
feature subset, and second best %C » 56% using the
PHZ-Only
subset.
By
comparison
with
full-dimensional performance of %C ≥ 90%, there is a
clear loss in discriminating “information” using the
DRA feature subsets. This is potentially attributable to
a loss in AMP-PHZ-FRQ feature synergism or simply
using
considerably
fewer
(66%
of
the
full-dimensional) features.
The noted disparity in Table 1 results is examined
further in the quantitative DRA results in Section 4.2.
At SNR = 14 dB, the best case DRA performance is
%C » 99.35% for PHZ-Only features, nearly the same
as the full-dimensional set with %C » 99.96%. This
indicates at this SNR, there is little information gained
from adding in the remaining features to a subset.

GRLVQI achieve statistically similar classification as
the full-dimensional set. The RndF method achieves
%C = 99.96% at NDRA = 97 features whereas the two
pre-classification methods achieve it at NDRA = 122
features. The largest deviation in %C from the fulldimensional set occurs at NF = 24 features
(approximately 10% of NFD). Even with only 10% of
the full-dimensional set, all four methods are
approximately within %C » 1%.

Indicates %C = 99.96% for
NDRA = NFD @ SNR = 14dB

Largest approximate deviation
where 0.2% < %CD < 1% when
NDRA = 10% of NFD = 24 feats

Figure 8. MDA/ML classification versus NDRA with
NFD = 243 full-dimensionl reference for SNR = 14 dB
and quantitatively selected DRA subsets.
Indicates %C = 99.96% for
NDRA = NFD @ SNR = 14dB

4.2. Quatitative DRA Feature Selection

MDA/ML classification results for quantitatively
selected DRA feature sets are shown using
SNR = 14 dB and SNR = 7 dB. DRA feature selection
was based on the rank-ordered feature relevance plots
like those shown in Fig. 6. Of note, the Fig. 6a (RndF)
and Fig. 6b (GRLVQI) post-classification method
plots clearly reflect a steep drop-off in feature
relevance with increasing sorted index number. This
differs from the pre-classification sorted relevances in
Fig. 6c (WRS) and Fig. 6d (ReliefF) which do contain
observable “breaks” that could serve as DRA
selection criteria. As noted in Step 4 of Section 3.4,
the quantitative NDRA Î {0.10, 0.15, …, 0.50}xNFD
DRA subsets were selected using sorted feature
rankings to identify the top-ranked 10%, 15%, …,
50% of the NFD = 243 of the full-dimensional features
at both SNR = 7 dB and SNR = 14 dB.
Classification performance for 24 £ NDRA £ 122
features (approximately 10% to 50% of NFD) are
shown in Fig. 8 for SNR = 14 dB. Performance of the
NFD = 243 full-dimensional %C = 99.96% (dashed
line) is also provided for reference. Based on CI95%
analysis, these results show that all methods except

Indicates %C = 93.35% for
NDRA = 81 PHZ-only feats
@ SNR = 14dB

Figure 9. MDA/ML classification using full
dimensional features and collective DRA performance
aaverages for SNR = 14 dB calcuated for 1) two preclassification (WRS and ReliefF) methods, and 2) two
post-classification (RndF and GRLVQI) methods,
with pre-classification being generally superior.
The cross-method averages for individual method
results in Fig. 8 are presented in Fig. 9 to enable a
general assessment of post-classification versus
pre-classification DRA selection methods.
For
reference, the plot also includes the NFD = 243
%C = 99.96% (upper dashed line) and NDRA = 81 best
case qualitative PHZ-Only %C = 99.35% (lower
dashed line) performances. As Fig. 9 results show, the
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pre-classification selection methods outperform the
post-classification selection methods when using up to
97 of the 122 features.
Classification results for NDRA = 24 features (10%
of NFD) to NDRA = 122 features (50% of NFD) are shown
in Fig. 10 for SNR = 7 dB.
The NFD = 243
full-dimensional %C = 90.5% (dashed line) is
provided for reference. These results show none of the
DRA subsets achieve full-dimensional performance
and there is no single method that consistently
outperforms the others for all NDRA considered. As
indicated, the WRS-selected feature performance is
1) best at the two higher NDRA values, and 2) consistent
with RndF, WRS, and ReliefF for a majority of
NDRA considered. The GRLVQI selected subsets are is
the overall poorest.

Figure 10. MDA/ML classification versus NDRA
showing the NFD = 243 full-dimensionl reference for
SNR = 7 dB and quantitatively selected DRA subsets.

Figure 11. Full-dimensional MDA/ML performance
and collective DRA averages for SNR = 7 dB
calculated across the 1) two pre-classification (WRS
and ReliefF) methods, and 2) two post-classification
(RndF and GRLVQI) methods. Averages indicate that
pre-classification is generally superior.

The cross-method averages for individual method
results in Fig. 10 are presented in Fig. 11 to enable a
general assessment of post-classification versus
pre-classification DRA selection methods.
For
reference, the plot also includes the NFD = 243
full-dimensional %C = 90.5% (upper dashed line) and
NDRA = 81 best case qualitative AMP-Only
%C = 63.0% (lower dashed line) performances. As
Fig. 11 results show, the pre-classification selection
methods outperform the post-classification selection
methods for all but the lowest NDRA = 24 subset
considered. However, it is obvious from Fig. 10 that
GRLVQI performance is the major contributor to the
poorer post-classification average.

4.3. DRA Method Analysis
Previous section results demonstrate that the
quantitative DRA methods used here are valid for
feature selection when comparing their performance
to qualitatively selected NRA = 81 feature subsets
(Fig. 7)
and
corresponding
NFD = 243
full-dimensional feature set.
The collective
cross-method
average
performance
of
pre-classification methods in Fig. 9 and Fig. 11 reflect
superior performance relative to the post-classification
selection methods. Individual method results when
features are selected at SNR = 14 dB in Fig. 8 show all
methods except GRLVQI achieve performance
statistically equal to the full-dimensional set.
Furthermore, at only 10% of the full-dimensional set,
the maximum performance deviation is %CD » 1%
which is still %C ≥ 99%. When selecting features at
SNR = 7 dB, Fig. 10 shows that no DRA method
achieved performance statistically equivalent to
%C = 90.5% using the NFD = 243 set.
Regardless of the NDRA value, the DRA method, or
the SNR value considered, all quantitative DRA
methods outperform qualitative DRA. This supports
the notion that quantitative DRA improves the
performance as compared to simple qualitative DRA
through the selection of a more relevant feature subset.
Between the two sets of quantitative DRA methods,
pre-classification methods are generally superior.
To fairly represent the post-classification methods,
it is important to note that the RndF and GRLVQI
results presented were generated using empirical
hyperparameter values from prior wireless signal
discrimination work and not necessarily optimized for
the WirelessHART application. Therefore, without
hyperparameter tuning it is unknown if the RndF and
GRLVQI results are representative of their best
performance. In terms of DRA applications, however,
the very fact that the post-classification methods have
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hyperparameters that require “tuning” adds a degree of
feature selection complexity that the pre-classification
methods do not possess. With that consideration, the
fact that both pre-classification methods considered
produce %C results that are better than, statistically
equivalent to, or consistent with (i.e., within
%CD » 4% for SNR = 7dB), the best performing RndF
post-classification method over the range of NDRA
investigated suggests their computational advantage
may outweigh any realized performance gain.

6. Acknowledgment

5. Summary and Conclusions

[2] FieldComm Group, "HART-Digital Transformation for
Analog
Instruments,”
[Online].
Available:
https://fieldcommgroup.org/technologies/hart, Accessed: 21
Aug 2019.

Security within the IIoT domain poses certain
challenges and PHY-based protection mechanisms
remain largely unexploited. This includes security of
WirelessHART signaling which is the largest digital
communications technology deployed in process
control industries, including over 40 million fielded
devices [2]. The challenges are further increased when
considering projections that predict exponential
WirelessHART growth through 2028 within the oil,
gas, chemical, and power generation industries [4].
PHY layer information may be reliably extracted
from various elements within the IIoT infrastructure
and support cross-layer security architectures [5]
providing timely and reliable defensive, offensive, and
exploitive actions. The extraction of useful PHY layer
information is addressed here using Time Domain
Distinct Native Attribute (TD-DNA) features from
WirelessHART signals. Specific emphasis is place on
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) methods with
a goal of improving computation efficiency and
moving closer to near-real time implementation by
reducing the number of fingerprint features required to
achieve desired discrimination performance.
The fingerprint DRA methods considered here
include 1) two post-classification RndF and GRLVQI
processes, and 2) two pre-classification WRS and
ReliefF statistical analysis methods. Collective
performance of pre-classification DRA methods was
superior to post-classification methods, with average
correct percent classification (%C) being 1) within
8% < %CD < 3% of full-dimensional (243 features)
%C = 90% performance at SNR = 7 dB using only 24
of 243 (~10%) and 122 of 243 (~50%) features,
respectively,
and
2) within
%CD » 1%
of
full-dimensional %C = 99% at SNR = 14 dB. While
some %C trade-off is expected and observed, the
DRA methods considered enable reliable feature
selection (reduction). This in-turn increases
computational efficiency and the potential for faster
TD-DNA fingerprinting in operational applications.
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Air Force Institute of Technology, the Department of
the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US
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